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The Myth of a
Uniform Federal Law
and the Reality of
CERCLA:
Arguments for
Application of the Law of
the Transferor Court
Following a Section
1404(a) Transfer of Venue
By David Charles Levy&
I. Introduction
Ilne cannot deny the reality of conflicting
interpretations of the same text of federal law.
Absent Supreme Court authority, each federal
circuit's interpretation is the law, by definition,
within that circuit. The myth of an objectively
discoverable federal law serves to conceal this
fact of sharply diverging interpretations of law
among the circuits. It tries to smooth the
ragged edges of what is, in reality, a federal
system of lower courts which continually apply
sometimes radically divergent views of the same
text.'
Litigation under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA or "the Act")
results in millions of dollars of liability every
year.' Yet the determinant of liability for a liti-
gant can be as simple as who files where, orwho
files first. The fact that CERCLA precedent is
non-uniform across the federal judicial circuits,
combined with the current federal rule that the
law of the transferee court applies following a
venue transfer in a federal question case, means
that venue alone can determine the outcome of
a case. Because of this rule, the most important
strategy for a litigant may be to get a case trans-
ferred from a venue with unfavorable precedent
to a more friendly arena. Changing the rule so
that the law of the source or transferor court
applies following the transfer, as in diversity
cases, would eliminate this procedural tactic,
allowing the substantive merits of the claims to
determine the outcome. Congress or the
Supreme Court must act to make this a reality,
to improve fairness not only for CERCLA liti-
gants, but for all who come before our federal
courts in federal question cases.
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A. An Example
Imagine a case where a Nebraska landown-
er asserts that a pesticide manufacturing com-
pany with offices in California should be liable
for cleaning up toxic contamination left
behind on the current owner's property. The
current landowner brings a CERCLA section
107 cost recovery action in federal district
court sitting in Nebraska, where, under the
CERCLA venue provision, venue is proper.' The
defendant company then moves successfully
to have the case transferred to the district
court for the Northern District of California,
where venue is also proper under section
113(b).
Imagine further that in many important
substantive areas CERCLA precedent may vary
in the transferee district and in the transferor
district. Due to these differences, the simple
procedural matter of the transfer could, in
effect, deny the Nebraska plaintiff's meritori-
ous substantive claims if the law of the trans-
feree court is applied. Thus, where the sub-
stantive law is non-uniform, and the law of the
transferee court is applied following a transfer,
a mere procedural change of venue may carry
with it the incredible bonus of an outcome-
determinative change of substantive law.
In fact, this is the current reality in CER-
CLA cases, despite the United States Supreme
Court's admonitions in Van Dusen v. Barrack and
Ferens v. John Deere Company.'
The legislative history of §
1404(a) certainly does not jus-
tify the rather startling conclu-
sion that one might 'get a
change of a law as a bonus for
a change of venue.' Indeed, an
interpretation accepting such
a rule would go far to frustrate
3. CERCLA § 113(b), 42 U.S.c. C 9613(b) (West 1998).
4. Id.
5. Van Dusen v. Barrack 376 U.S. 608. 635 (1964); Ferens v.
John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 511. 522 (1990).
6. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 635-37, quoted in Ferens. 494 U.S. at
522-523.
7. See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 62 (1938). See
also Van Dusen. 376 U.S. at 635; Ferens. 494 U.S. at 522. Of course
the reverse can also occur where a plaintiff chooses a certain
the remedial purposes of sec-
tion 1404(a). If a change in the
law were in the offing, the par-
ties might well regard the sec-
tion primarily as a forum-
shopping instrument. And,
more importantly, courts
would at least be reluctant to
grant transfers, despite con-
siderations of convenience, if
to do so might conceivably
prejudice the claim of a plain-
tiff who initially selected a
permissible forum.,
Thus, to continue to allow this through
the application of transferee law is actually to
reward and encourage forum shopping, which
is clearly not consistent with the goals and
purposes of the federal court system.
7
B. The Road Ahead
The purpose of this note is three-fold. The
first is to present arguments on each side of
the issue of whether the law of the transferor
or the transferee court should apply following
a transfer of venue in a federal question case.
Second is to analyze the development of CER-
CLA case law and to show that it has deveoped
in an extraordinarily non-uniform manner
across the federal circuits. Finally, the note will
conclude that in the case of a statute with geo-
graphically non-uniform case law, such as
CERCLA, the impetus becomes particularly
strong to apply the law of the transferor court,
as the implications for litigants can be enor-
mous. It is recommended, therefore, that
Congress amend the statute's venue provision
to make this a reality, or that the Supreme
Court act to make the transferor court's law
generally applicable in federal question cases.
forum because of its advantageous substantive law and the
defendant suffers because he Is unable to gain a transfer to a
more friendly venue. In that situation, however, the choice of
forum can be a major issue in the case requiring substantial time
and resources to hear the defendant's Inevitable transfer motion
motivated by non-uniformity in the law and the hope of applying
a different court's law. On the other hand, If the transferor court's
law were the rule, such a motion would be less likely to be
brought because there would be no substantive law benefit from
a transfer.
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Currently, it is an open question whether,
following a transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C.
section 1404(a) in a federal question case, the
substantive law of the transferor court or that
of the transferee court shall apply Neither the
Supreme Court nor Congress have spoken.
thus the question remains undecided. Current-
ly, the prevalent view among the circuits
appears to be that the law of the transferee
court should apply.9 The primary basis for this
opinion is a theory that a "uniform federal law"
exists and thus the decision as to applicable
law should be governed by federalism and judi-'
cial sovereignty concerns, not by the plaintiff's
choice of forum.'°The reality of this rule, how-
ever, is that lawyers recognize that "the forum
for an action will ... bear on the governing sub-
stantive law," and thus in practice "selecting
the forum is a fundamental part of the strategy
in commencing a lawsuit.""
As will be shown, over its eighteen-year life
CERCLA case law has developed in an
extremely non-uniform fashion among the var-
ious federal judicial districts of the country.
This non-uniformity makes it particularly
important that the law of the transferor forum
apply in CERCLA cases following a transfer of
venue. The substantive law, as applied, has
severe implications for critical aspects of a liti-
gant's case and for his legal rights and reme-
dies. Applying the law of the transferee court in
cases involving statutes with geographically
non-uniform application can result in a defen-
dant defeating a plaintiff's substantively meri-
torious claims merely through a series of pro-
cedural maneuvers. This is not the purpose or
objective of our legal system. Moreover. allow-
ing the transferee court's law to apply encour-
ages forum shopping and procedural maneu-
8. See, e.g.. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 608. 612 (1964);
Ferens v. John Deere Co.. 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (construing 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
9. See. e.g., In re Korean Airlines Disaster. 829 E2d 1171
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ruth B. Ginsburg, 1.), aftd on other grounds sub
nom; Chan v. Korean Air Lines. Ltd.. 490 U.S. 12 (1989). Menowltz
v. Brown. 991 F.2d 36. 41 (2d Cir. 1993): In re Norplant
Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig.. 878 F. Supp. 972. 975 (E.D. Tex.
1995); In reAir Disaster. 819 F. Supp. 1352.1371 (E.D. Mich. 1993),
10. See Richard L Marcus. Conflicts Among Circuits and
Transers Within the Federal Judicial System. 93 YALE Ll. 677(1984).
11. Gary Naftalis & Michael Oberman. Ward Off Forum Woes,
vering that distracts the court from resolving
the substantive issues at hand. Anything short
of a simple, straightforward rule that the law of
the transferor court applies after a transfer re-
duces the fairness, efficiency and economy of
the judicial system. Such a rule is necessitated
by the fact that, despite highly respected judi-
cial and scholarly commentary to the contrary.
uniformity in federal law across the circuits
remains much more of a myth than a reality.
II. Transfer of Venue in the Federal Courts
Generally
Where venue is proper in more than one
forum, section 1404(a) permits the court or
either party to move for a transfer of venue
from that originally chosen by the plaintiff to
another court of the same level.'2 The rule
states that, "Iflor the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a dis-
trict court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have
been brought."'3 Such a transfer takes place at
the discretion of the court, usually upon defen-
dant's motion." Courts are generally reluctant
to disturb the plaintiff's original choice of
forum, thus a motion to transfer venue must
have strong support in order to be granted."
A motion to transfer venue must be evalu-
ated on a number of case-specific factors,
revolving generally around convenience and
fairness to the litigants and the interests of
justice." The burden is on the moving party
to show that transfer to another forum is
proper and necessary."' In 1946, the Supreme
Court in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert set out a number of fac-
tors for use in evaluating a forum non conve-
niens motion, which is very similar to a transfer
ABA JouLNAL. Mar 1999. at 65.
12. 28USC§ 1404(a) tWest 1998),
13. It
14. Se Ferens v. John Deere. Co.. 494 Us, 516 (1990]:
Stewart Org.. Inc. v. Ricoh Corp,. 487 U.S. 22.29 (1988).
15. SteVan Dusen v. Barrack. 376 US. 608.619 (1964): Gulf
Oil Corp. v, Gilbert. 330 UoS. 501. 508 (1946) (setting out factors
to consider for'transfer' in forum non conveniens context).
16. SeeSltwrt Or.487US.at29,
17. See Verosol B. v. Hunter Douglas. Inc. 806 F Supp.
582. 592 (ED, Va, 1992).
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of venue. 8 The Court made its deference to the
plaintiff's original choice of forum very clear."
The Court held that, in order for a court to grant
the motion, there must be some factor, or com-
bination of factors, so significantly in favor of a
transfer that it overwhelms this original pre-
sumption." The Court also cited "public interest
factors," including the relative congestion of
court dockets, choice of law considerations, and
any community relationship to the occurrences
giving rise to the litigation that may bias local
courts and jurors.2
The Gulf Oil Court also left open the door to
consideration of the substantive law that would
be applied following a transfer.' If application of
the law of the transferee court could be shown to
have potentially significant negative conse-
quences for the plaintiff's case, this would likely
weigh heavily against a transfer, as it would vio-
late the longstanding policy against defendants
benefiting from forum shopping.3 In summary,
"unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed."24
III. Applicable Substantive Law Following a
Transfer of Venue
Despite the reluctance of courts to grant
transfers of venue,2' they are a common feature
of litigation in courts around the country.26 If a
court does grant a transfer, the critical question
then becomes which circuit's law applies to the
substantive issues at hand-that of the transfer-
or court where the case was originally brought
18. 330 U.S. at 508.
19. See id.
20. See Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 62 (1938);
Black & White Taxi & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
24. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507; see also Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 608, 619 (1964).
25. See Guf Oil, 330 U.S. at 501.
26. See Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in
Consolidated and Transferred cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 595 (1987).
27. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 612.
by the plaintiff, or that of the transferee court, In
1964, the Supreme Court in Van Dusen v. Barrack
squarely answered this question for cases where
federal court jurisdiction is based on diversity
among the parties." In a diversity case, following
a defendant's motion to transfer venue under
section 1404(a), the Court held that the law of
the transferor court should apply. The Court
read section 1404(a) as a measure intended sim-
ply to counteract the inconveniences that flow
from broad venue provisions.' Thus, the Court
emphatically declared that "[a) change of venue
... should be, with respect to state law, but a
change of courtrooms.""
Twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court In
Ferens v. John Deere Co., extended Van Dusen to
apply to cases in which the motion to transfer
was made by the plaintiff." The Court advocated
for clarity and simplicity, stating that: "Ifloresight
and judicial economy now seem to favor the
simple rule that the law does not change follow-
ing a transfer of venue under section 1404(a)."2
It is not clear, however, that Van Dusen and
Ferens also apply to federal question cases,"
such as those brought under CERCLA. Thus, the
question of which court's law applies following a
transfer remains open. Currently, the circuits are
split, although the prevalent view is that differ-
ent circuits are not like different states, and thus
in a federal question case, the law of the trans-
feree circuit should apply.4
Where a federal statute has a specific venue
provision, that provision controls over the gen-
eral federal court venue provision set forth in 28
U.S.C. section 13912' CERCLA is one such
28. See id.
29. See id. at 635.
30. Id. at 630.
31. Ferensv. John Deere Co.. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
32. Id. at 530.
33. See id. at 520.
34. See, e.g., In re Korean Airlines Disaster, 829 F2d 1171
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ruth B. Ginsburg, J.), affd on other grounds sub
nom; Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S, 12 (1989); Menowltz
v. Brown, 991 F2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 19931; In re Norplant
Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 878 F. Supp. 972, 975 (ED, Tex.
1995); In reAir Disaster, 819 F. Supp. 1352, 1371 (E D. Mich, 1993);
Marcus, supra note 10, at 677.
35. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmlrra Corp,. 353 U.S, 222,
228 (1956).
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statute.16 The statute's venue provision. section
113(b) of the Act, states that in a CERCLA
action venue is proper, "in any district in which
the release or damages occurred, or in which
the defendant resides, may be found, or has his
principal office."37 Thus, in many CERCLA
actions venue is proper in at least two forums.
This is similar to the section 1391 venue provi-
sion that governs generally, thus the CERCLA
case is not unique in this respect. Due to the
nature of the statute and the fact that large,
multi-site corporations and large numbers of
litigants are frequently involved in CERCLA
cases, the number of potential forums may
increase further, and will often be spread
across multiple federal circuits. This is the
exact type of situation that the Van Dusen Court
sought to address with its ruling that the law of
the transferor court should apply to counteract
the effects of a broad venue provision."
Various federal courts have taken different
approaches to resolving this dilemma. The
majority approach, taken by the Second, Fifth,
Sixth, and D.C. Circuits, holds simply that fol-
lowing a change of venue in a federal question
case, the law of the transferee court should
apply, regardless of the uniformity of the
statute and related case law, or lack thereof."
The courts support this claim with a sufficient-
ly uniform federal law which states that the
independent judgment of a federal court
should not be infringed upon by requiring it to
follow the law of a court from a different cir-
cuit.,
Other courts have found that certain cir-
cumstances necessitate an exception to this
general rule.4' For instance, the Seventh Cir-
cuit, in Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, held that
where the non-uniformity of the application of
the federal statute involved was great the court
should apply the law of the transferor forum."
Distinguishing a Second Circuit opinion
36. See CERCLA § 113(b). 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (West 1998).
37. Id.
38. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 608, 635 (1964).
39. See. e.g.. Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 41: In re Norplant
Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig.. 878 F. Supp. at 975; In re Air
Disaster 819 F. Supp. at 1371 (citing In re Korean Airlines Disaster.
829 F.2d at 1171).
(Menowitz) that followed the District of
Columbia Circuit in Korean Airlines, the Eckstein
court reasoned that:
Menowitz held that Van Dusen
and Ferens apply only in diver-
sity cases. We believe that this
conclusion disregards both
the language of Ithe statute]
(whose reference to 'the juris-
diction" implies a non-uniform
federal law) and the holdings of
Van Dusen and Ferens, which
construed 1404(a) ratherthan
any principle of state law.
Although both of those cases
arose under the diversity juris-
diction, their references to Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, do not imply a
ruling limited to state law. Erie
is itself part of national law,
interpreting the Rules of
Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
Van Dusen and Ferens accord-
ingly apply whenever different
federal courts properly use dif-
ferent rules ... When the law of
the United States is geographically
non-uniform, a transferee court
should use the rule of the transferor
forum in order to implement the
central conclusion of Van Dusen
and Ferens: that a transfer under
1404(a) accomplishes "but a change
of courtrooms. "11
The court acknowledged that lal single fed-
eral law implies a national interpretation.
Although courts of appeal cannot achieve this
on their own, the norm is that each court of
appeals considers the question independently
and reaches its own decision, without regard to
40, See gmnerally cases cited supra note 39.
41. See, e4.. Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F3d 1121.
1126 (7th Cir. 1993). er. dtek, 510 U.S. 1073 (1994); Wegbreit v.
Marley Orchards Corp,. 793 E Supp. 965, 968 (E.D. Wash. 1992),
Olcottv. Delaware Flood Co.. 76 F3d 1538, 1545 (10th Cir. 1996).
42. FJstex, 8 F.3d at 1126.
43. Id. at 1126 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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the geographic location of the events giving
rise to the litigation.""" The court stated gener-
ally that "[wle agree with Korean Air Lines that a
transferee'court normally should use its own
best judgment about the meaning of federal
law when evaluating a federal claim.""' The
court emphasized, however, that the unique
considerations that arise when the underlying
substantive law is geographically non-uniform
require that the substantive law of the transfer-
or court be applied.' The Supreme Court has
not addressed this question, despite the obvi-
ous conflict among the circuits.
Courts within the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have joined the Seventh Circuit in holding that
where federal law is geographically non-uni-
form, the law of the transferor court should
apply.'" In Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., the
district court for the Eastern District of
Washington reasoned that the rule of "inde-
pendent judgment" allowing transferee circuits
to decide which court's law to apply was suffi-
ciently tempered by the Supreme Court's
admonition that the transferee court should
"strive to avoid conflicts" so that in cases of
non-uniform federal law the law of the trans-
feror court should apply.'" The court found that
in addition to protecting the interests and
rights of a plaintiff, judicial economy further
requires that the law of the transferor court
apply following a transfer of venue in a federal
question case."
In Olcott v. Delaware Flood, the Tenth Circuit
held that the law of the transferor court should
apply based on the particular statute at issue
in that case." Like Eckstein, Olcott involved an
issue evolving from the Securities Act of 1933."
The court reasoned that:
44. Id. at 1126. See also Marcus, supra note 10.
45. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1126.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1125.
48. See Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp.
965, 968 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co., 76 F.3d
1538, 1545 (10th Cir. 1996).
49. Wegbreit, 793 F. Supp. at 968-69 (citing Ferens v. John
Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990)).
50. Se id. at 969 n.10 (citing Ferens, 494 U.S. at 530).
liln short, unlike the typical
situation, Congress specifical-
ly intended that "the geo-
graphical location of the
events giving rise to the litiga-
tion," should explicitly be
taken into consideration. We
also agree with the Seventh
Circuit that it therefore makes
no sense for the applicable
law to change simply as a
result of a motion to transfer.
Further, the legislative history
of [the statutel "certainly does
not justify the rather startling
conclusion that one might 'get
a change of law as a bonus for
a change of venue. '
Implicitly in its holding, and by explicitly
following Eckstein, the Olcott court set out geo-
graphic non-uniformity as the threshold ques-
tion for determining when the law of the trans-
feror court should apply." The cou't's admoni-
tion against a change of venue resulting In a
change of law would go unheeded if the law of
the transferee court were applied where
disharmony existed among the circuits."
Additionally, the court made specific reference
to consideration of the geographical location
of the events giving rise to the litigation."
This reasoning is directly applicable to
CERCLA as well. Congress' intent that "the
location of the events giving rise to the litiga-
tion should be taken into consideration" In
CERCLA litigation is clear from the statute's
venue provision which states that venue Is
proper where the release occurred or where the
potentially responsible party has its principal
51. Olcolt, 76 F.3d at 1546.
52. Id. at 1546 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78),
53. Id. (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 US. 608, 636
(1964)).
54. Id. (citing Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121,
1126 (7th Cir. 1993)).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. CERCLA 4113, 42 U.S.C.§ 9613 (West 1998).
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considerations discussed in Van Dusen.'8
Ferens, and Wegbreit.6 for example, that stem
from geographically non-uniform case law.
Thus, if it is determined that the application of
CERCLA over the past eighteen years has
occurred in a geographically non-uniform man-
ner, and that the CERCLA statute itself makes
references to the location of the events giving
rise to the litigation, then the rule in CERCLA
cases should be that the substantive law of the
transferor court shall apply following a change
of venue under section 1404(a).
IV. Non-Uniformity and CERCLA
The critical questions for this analysis
becomes: 1) does tle CERCLA statute make
explicit references to the relationship between
the events giving rise to the litigation, and the
place where the litigation should take place,
and 2) is CERCLA sufficiently geographically
non-uniform in its application that courts
should apply the law of the transferor court fol-
lowing a transfer of venue? The answer to both
questions is yes.
A. The Statute
The logical place to begin is with the CER-
CLA statute itself. Besides the statute's specif-
ic venue provision in section 113(b), there are
at least three other places in the CERCLA
statute that refer to the location of possible
legal action under the statute. The first is sec-
tion 106, which governs maintenance actions
in emergency situations.' There, the statute
explicitly grants jurisdiction to the "district
court of the United States in which the threat
occurs" to grant relief as public interest may
require.' The second reference is in the section
58. Van Dusen v. Borrack. 376 U.S. 608,612 (1964).
59. Ferensv. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
60. Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp.. 793 E Supp. 965
(E.D. Wash. 1992).
61. CERCLA § 106(a). 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (West 1998).
62. Id.
63. See CERCLA § 107(1)(4). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1)(4) (West
1998).
64. Id.
65. CERCLA § 112(d)(5).42 U.S.C. §9612(d)(5) (West 1998).
authorizing the federal government to place a
lien against an entity responsible for costs or
damages under the statute. 3 Section 107(l)(4)
states that the lien "may be recovered in an
action in rem in the United States district court
for the district in which the removal or remedi-
al action is occurring or has occurred.'" Finally,
section I12(d) requires that any party appeal-
ing a decision regarding a claim for response
costs may make such an appeal only to the
"federal district court for the district where the
release or threat of release took place." From
these provisions of the CERCLA statute it
appears that Congress contemplated that the
majority of legal actions would occur in the
district where the contamination or release
occurred. It is not at all clear, however, that
Congress anticipated that these cases would
subsequently be transferred to other districts
by defendants seeking more favorable prece-
dent.'
Further supporting this rationale from a
statutory perspective is the venue provision of
the Solid Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA7). one of
CERCLAs closest cousins in the federal
scheme of environmental laws Under the
SWDA, "any action ... shall be brought in the
district court for the district in which the
alleged violation occurred or the alleged
endangerment may occur."" This limitation on
venue generally eliminates the transfer of
venue problem that arises with CERCLAs more
generous venue statute because section
1404(a) does not permit a transfer to a venue
in which the suit could not originally have
been brought.L " Thus, one may speculate that
upon further reflection. Congress realized that
under the current state of the common law
regarding applicable law following a transfer of
66. CERCLA was passed with great haste and very little
debate at the very tail-end of the CarterAdministraton, Therefore.
legislative history that might normally answer some of these
questions does not exist See Redwing Carners. Inc v, Saraland
Apartments. 94 F3d 1489.1499 (1 lth cir 1996) (citing Smith Land
& Improvement Corp. v Celotex Corp.. 851 F2d 86. 91 (3d Cir.
1988); Dedham Water Co v, Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. 805
F2d 1074. 1080 list Cir 1986)).
67. See SWDA §7002(a). 42 U.S C §6972(a) (West 1998).
68. Id.
69- Seee.g.Van Dusenv. Barrack. 376 U'S. 608,635 (1964);
28 U.SC. § 1404(a) (West 199U)
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under the current state of the common law
regarding applicable law following a transfer of
venue in these federal question cases, these
environmental liability statutes themselves
must contain limiting venue provisions. In any
case, it is clear that CERCLA meets the Olcott
criteria for applying the law of the transferor
court."
B. CERCLA Case Law
The second prong of this analysis requires
a test of whether CERCLA is sufficiently non-
uniform that the Eckstein rationale supports the
application of the transferor circuit's law upon
a change of venue under section 1404(a).7'
CERCLA is an extremely complex statute, and
CERCLA actions have covered a wide variety of
issues. The point to be made here, however,
that CERCLA precedents are geographically
non-uniform, requires a few examples. There-
fore, this section focuses on a few common
CERCLA causes of action, and the precedents
that have evolved in these areas from different
circuits. These particular causes of action have
also been chosen because the implications of
geographic non-uniformity, via application of
the transferee court's law, may be particularly
severe in these areas.
1. Tort Liability
In all areas of law, most non-contractual
liability ultimately derives from the ancient
common law of torts. This holds true with CER-
CLA cases as well. In many CERCLA actions,
plaintiffs seek to establish liability on both fed-
eral statutory grounds under CERCLA and
state common law tort grounds. Recognizing
Congress' intent that "traditional and evolving
common law principles" should define the
scope of liability under CERCLA, "courts have
looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
particularly section 433A, for guidance."' This
raises further issues of non-uniformity, due to
70. Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co., 76 E3d 1538. 1545 (10th
Cir. 1996).
71. Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 E3d 1121. 1126 (7th
Cir. 1993).
72. Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1513.
73. See Id. at 1500 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods,
varying state laws, varying interpretations and
levels of acceptance of the Restatement by dif-
ferent states, and to varying federal court inter-
pretations of how pendent state law claims
should interact with CERCLA claims. More-
over, federal courts must frequently decide
individually whether to fashion a "uniform"
federal rule or to apply state law, generally
using the Kinbell Foods test set forth by the
Supreme Court. ' Thus, the opportunity for
non-uniformity is rampant.
Liability for cleanup costs is the funda-
mental premise of CERCLA. Of course, tort lia-
bility and related concepts such as successor,
corporate and partnership liability are exten-
sively covered by state law. This fact, coupled
with CERCLAs extensive interaction with and
dependence on state law causes of action,
means that from the outset CERCLA is inher-
ently non-uniform.
In large part, CERCLA is a statute about
liability.7' Perhaps the primary purpose of CER-
CLA is to apportion liability for the costs of
cleaning up contaminated sites."' Thus, geo-
graphic non-uniformity with regard to the
imposition of liability under CERCLA trans-
lates to a fundamental geographic non-unifor-
mity for the statute as a whole. Therefore,
imbalanced liability imposition provides par-
ticularly strong support for the as-sertion that
the law of the transferor court should apply as
a rule in all CERCLA actions.
2. Corporate Liability
Many parties to CERCLA actions are corpo-
rations. The liability concerns of their share-
holders, officers and employees, and predeces-
sors and successors are fundamental to the
outcome of CERCLA actions. Despite the criti-
cal nature of this issue, "[iln resolving ques-
tions of liability for shareholders, officers and
employees of corporations under CERCLA,
courts have reached different conclusions on
Inc, 440 U.S. 715, 726-28 (1979)). See also Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363. 366-67 (1943).
74. See, e.g., CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (West 1998),
75. See CERCLA §§ 107, 113.42 U.S.C. §§ 9507,9613 (West
1998).
76. Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1497.
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whether state or federal common law provides
the rule of decision. "'76 For example, in Anspec
Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
held that the defendants' motions for dis-
missal should be denied under the Michigan
state law rules of successor liability and corpo-
rate parent liability.' Moreover, in a concurring
opinion, then Judge Anthony Kennedy wrote
that "Inleither the language nor the legislative
history of CERCLA provides a basis for con-
cluding that the creation of a uniform federal
common law rule of successorship liability was
intended. I would decline to create a uniform
federal rule here."' Thus, in interpreting the
federal statute, this court not only applied
state law, which results in geographic non-uni-
formity across the nation, but interpreted the
statute to essentially mandate the use of state
law, thereby incorporating geographic non-uni-
formity into the statute itself, at least as it is
applied in the Sixth Circuit."
Proof of further geographic non-uniformity
of CERCLA with respect to this issue is not dif-
ficult to discover. In Louisiana-Pacific Corporation
v. Asarco, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held exactly the
opposite of the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Anspec. ' The Louisiana-Pacific court held that fed-
eral common law should govern the issue of
corporate successor liability."' If this view were
followed by all circuits, geographic non-unifor-
mity would only be an issue to the extent that
the federal common law fashioned by each cir-
cuit differed. As the Sixth Circuit's holding in
Anspec and the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Lousiana-Pacific demonstrate, the issue of cor-
porate successor liability that is so very funda-
mental to the purposes and operation of CER-
CLA geographic non-uniformity in the applica-
tion of the statute is a significant reality.Y
In December, 1997, the Ninth Circuit ap-
peared to have resolved its difference of opin-
77. Anspec Co.. Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.. 922 F2d
1240. 1247 (6th Cir. 1991).
78. Id. at 1248 (Kennedy. I.. concurring).
79. See id.
80. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1993).
81. Id.at 1263.
82. Compare Anspec Co.. 922 F.2d at 1248, with Louisiana-
Pacific. 909 F.2d at 1263.
83. See Atchison. Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown &
ion with the Sixth Circuit regarding this issue.'
In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., the
court held that "there is no need for a federal
common law of successor liability under CER-
CLA. Ibecausel state law supplies the rule of
decision in this area.' This decision was con-
trary to the same court's 1990 holding in
Louisiana-Pacific on this issue, although the court
declined to explicitly overrule its prior holding!'
This latest decision is 'contrary to precedent in
all federal circuits except the Sixth Circuit."m
Thus, in finding common ground with the Sixth
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has now set itself at
odds with all of the remaining circuits.
Moreover, in declining to explicitly overrule its
previous holding, the court has left litigants in
the Ninth Circuit facing double uncertainty.
First, a litigant must wonder what is the prece-
dent, and second, upon determining that there
may be multiple precedents, which precedent
should be followed.
It is interesting to note that in reaching con-
trary holdings in the two previous cases, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the court
below each time.' Thus, it is clear that the court
of appeals is anything but settled in its opinion
on this issue. If the consequences for litigants
were not so serious, the whole situation would
almost be laughable.
The court's reversal on this issue illustrates
both the consequences of this inherent non-
uniformity that stem from incorporating state
law, and the -mobile nature of CERCLA case
law that enhances the problems created for liti-
gants by this same non-uniformity. The fact that
the Ninth Circuit has reversed itself as to this
important issue, after seven years of settled
precedent, confirms the uncertainty that CER-
CLA litigants face, even within one federal cir-
cuit. While it is true that the event of a court
reversing itself is far from unique to CERCLA, it
Bryant, Inc. 132 F3d 1295 (9th cOr. 1997j,
84. Id. at 1297
85. lI. at 1297-98 (atlng Louisiana-Pgcf. 909 F2d at 1260.
86. lames R. Arnold, CAu=L, REAL Esmm REPo~mt. 40-
41 (Feb. 1998)
87. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown &
Bryant. Inc. 132 F3d at 1295, affd 42 ERC 1605 (E.D. Cal. 1995):
Lois a., 909 F2d at 1260, ef d 29 ERC 1450 (WD. Wash.
1989),
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is rather uncommon when it occurs as to a
major issue of settled law, and in particular one
where the vast majority of the other circuits are
in concurrence with the prior holding.
Regardless of the reasoning, the implica-
tions of non-uniformity in this area are particu-
larly troubling. CERCLA is essentially about
ascertaining and apportioning liability for huge-
ly expensive toxic waste cleanup operations.
Liability under CERCLA is retroactive and joint
and several.' Thus, the issue of successor liabil-
ity is nearly the same, and nearly as critical, as
the core issue of liability itself. As for a defen-
dant wishing to defeat a substantive claim using
section 1404(a) to shop for the jurisdiction with
precedent in his favor, he has at his disposal a
virtual catalog of legal rules from which to
choose.
In 1998, however, when the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Bestfoods, it appeared that
all hope was not lost.89 But, in perhaps putting
the lid on one can of CERCLA worms, the Court
may have actually taken it off another. Bestfoods
arose out of contamination at a chemical plant
in Michigan."J In 1957, Ott Chemical Co. began
manufacturing chemicals at the site near
Muskegon. From 1965 to 1972, the site was
owned and operated by a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of CPC International, Inc., called Ott I1.
(CPC is now owned by Respondent Bestfoods.)
During this period, CPC selected the board of
directors of Ott I1, including members of the
CPC board and a CPC official. The official, iden-
tified as G.R.D. Williams, "played a significant
role in shaping Ott 11's environmental compli-
ance policy."' Massive pollution of soil and
groundwater occurred at the site from 1957 until
at least 1977. In 1981, EPA initiated remedial
activities at the site, and in 1989 filed this action
under section 107 of CERCLA to recover its
costs.
The district court found CPC liable based on
88. See CERCLA § 107(c)(2). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2) (West
1998).
89. United States v. Bestfoods. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). See also
Coffin. Hines, et al., "Landels Advisory: United States v. Bestfoods:
The Supreme Court Tackles Parent Liability Under CERCLA,"
Landels, Ripley & Diamond, LLP (June 1998); Belynda B. Reck,
"Smooth Operator," DALY JOURNAL, April 9. 1999.
90. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 57.
its general control over Ott I1 during the period
that contamination occurred.9" The Sixth
Circuit, applying Michigan state veil-piercing
law, determined that, despite the lack of sepa-
rateness between the parent and the sub-
sidiary in environmental matters, the corpo-
rate form had not been used to "perpetrate
fraud or subvert justice," and therefore re-
versed the district court. 3 The Supreme Court
agreed with the Sixth Circuit's decision on veil-
piercing generally, but the Court vacated the
decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings on the issue of whether CPC had
exercised sufficient direct control over the facil-
ity so that liability should attach."' The Court
stated unequivocally that the mere incidence
of control of the subsidiary, without more, was
insufficient to establish liability per se, but that
derivative liability was still possible under
state law veil-piercing doctrine. However,
according to the court, activities were not suf-
ficiently eccentric for piercing to apply and that
"Itlhe analysis should instead have rested on
the relationship between lBestfoodsl and the
Muskegon facility itself."9
Ultimately, the Bestfoods Court held that: 1)
a parent corporation that actively participates
in, and exercises control over the operations of
a subsidiary may not, without more, be held
liable as an owner or operator of a polluting
facility owned or operated by the subsidiary
(the only exception to this rule regarding
"derivative liability" being when facts support
piercing the corporate veil under state law
standards); I and 2) a corporate parent that
actively participates in, and exercises control
over, the operations of the specific facility in
controversy may be held directly liable in its
own right as an operator of the facility. Thus,
the Bestfoods decision appears to have cleared
up the area of derivative liability under CER-
CLA. Simultaneously, however, it has exposed
91. id. at 58.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 58-59.
94. See id. at 59-60, 62.
95. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 64-65.
97. See id.
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fertile ground for fact-based disputes over
what constitutes operation or control of the
facility sufficient to attach direct liability. With
both sides claiming victory after the Court
released its decision, the implications of the
holding are unclear. Thus, despite the efforts of
the Supreme Court, CERCLA continues to
evade uniformity.
3. "Uniform" Federal Law Evolves
from Non-Uniform State Law
Even if the Ninth Circuit had upheld
Louisiana-Pacific and continued the practice of
determining successor liability under federal
law, that would not necessarily eliminate geo-
graphic non-uniformity in CERCLA litigation.
In fact, uniform federal law in itself is poten-
tially a non-uniform concept." The decision to
create federal law is a very difficult one and is
itself, in the absence of a United States
Supreme. Court ruling on the subject, within
the discretion of each federal circuit court." For
example, the Ninth Circuit's reversal in Atchison,
Topeka was predicated-on its interpretation of
two Supreme Court cases that held that issues
not explicitly addressed by federal statutes
should be governed by state law.'" (Apparently,
all of the other circuits except the Sixth and
Ninth interpret those cases differently.) The
cases relied on by the Ninth Circuit held that
federal law should only be created where the
federal court discerns a significant conflict
between some overarching federal policy and
existing state law.'01
The finding that the decision to create fed-
eral common law is informed by existing state
law further enhances the chance for non-
uniformity in the development of so-called uni-
* form federal law. 2 By definition, the significance
of the threshold conflict depends on the exist-
ing state law, which may be different from state
98. See. e.g.. Fini. supra note I. at 49.
99. See. e.g.. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.. 440 U.S.
715. 726-28 (1979); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States. 318 US.
363. 366-67 (1943).
100. Atchison. Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown &
Bryant. Inc., 132 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing O'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994); Atherton v. FDIC. 117 S. CL 666
(1997)).
101. See id.
to state and, therefore, circuit to circuit.
Moreover, the second prong of this analysis.
the finding of a sufficient conflict, is also dis-
cretionary and subjective. Thus, the very deter-
mination of whether a court should fashion
.uniform- federal law will differ across federal
circuits, as. most likely, will the federal com-
mon law that results.
State law has grown to be largely impor-
tant in environmental protection, including
areas governed by CERCLA. In fact, most of
the events that give rise to CERCLA's invoca-
tion are also governed by state laws such as
environmental protection acts, toxic sub-
stance laws and insurance laws. 3 In light of
the importance of state law in this area, per-
haps the creation of uniform federal law is not
a prudent course of action. Although environ-
mental protection is clearly an area of impor-
tant national concern, in the name of federal-
ism, and in light of dramatically different envi-
ronmental conditions and concerns through-
out the country, state law should perhaps be
given significant deference. However, if that
occurs, it becomes even more important that
the plaintiff's choice of law is supported by
bringing the law of the transferor court with
the suit. An increase in the incorporation of
state law means an increase in non-uniformi-
ty. Many of the basic assumptions and actions
of the plaintiff are predicated on beliefs about
the potential benefits and requirements of
specific state laws. It is simply unfair for an
out-of-state defendant to be able to avail
themselves of the benefits and protections of
one state when it is convenient for them, but
also to be able to run and hide by transferring
a case brought in federal court with pendent
state law claims to a forum with more friendly
laws.
"As several jurists have noted, Congress
102. Se, eg. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943); Del Costello v. International Bhd, of Teamsters, 462
US 151 (1983).
103. See. e4. Porter-Cologne Water Ouahty Control Act.
Cal. Water Code §§ 13000 ef eq,; Cal. Clean Air Act. Health &
Safety Code §§ 39000 a seq; Hazardous Waste Control Law, Cal.
Health & Safety Code §§ 25100 e s,; CarpenterPresley-Tanner
Hazardous Substance Account Act. Cal. Health & Safety Code §
25300 d seq,; Proposition 65, Cal. Health & Safety Code §
251807. 25189,5.25192.25249,5-10.
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passed CERCLA in great haste and in the
process left many holes in its framework for
courts to fill in. ' "° Even statutes that undergo a
full complement of congressional debate and
revision frequently leave important issues
unaddressed. It is simply not possible for the
drafters of statutes to foresee every possible
application of a law and to provide for each in
the statute. Thus, in CERCLA, as in any federal
statute, many issues are left to be determined
by each federal circuit, either by creating feder-
al common law or by incorporating state law.
Either way, the result over time is thirteen dif-
fering bodies of law, one for each circuit. The
inevitable resulting non-uniformity means that
application of the law of the transferor court
must be the rule.
4. Attorneys' Fees
Because of the complexity of most CER-
CLA actions, and in particular the number of
parties involved, CERCLA litigation can be
extraordinarily costly and time-consuming.
Thus, recovery of attorneys' fees can be an
important part of the final disposition of a
CERCLA action. Here again, however, is an area
where CERCLA case law has developed in a
geographically non-uniform manner.
In 1994, it appeared that the Supreme
Court had resolved the conflict between the
circuits over whether a private plaintiff could
recover attorneys' fees and litigation costs in a
CERCLA action for cost recovery under section
107(a)(4)(B).'0 ' Deciding Stanton Road Associates v.
Lohrey Enterprises in 1993, the Ninth Circuit
denied such a recovery.'" The court reasoned
that because section 107 merely provides for
recovery of costs for "enforcement activities,"
while other sections of the Act specifically pro-
vide for recovery of attorneys' fees, the plaintiff
should not be allowed to recover attorneys'
104. Redwing Carriers v. Saraland Apartments. 94 F.3d
1489. 1499 (1I1th Cir. 1996) (citing Smith Land & Improvement
Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988). See also
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 E2d
1074. 1080 (1st Cir. 1986)).
105. See Keytronic Corp. v. United States. 511 U.S. 809
(1994).
106. 984 F2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).
107. Seeld.atlOl9.
fees or litigation costs in a section 107 cost
recovery action.' 7
When compared to the express provi-
sions for attorneys' fees in these sec-
tions of CERCLA, the term "enforce-
ment activities" would appear to be
"outside even the most exhaustive lex-
icon of customary fee shifting lan-
guage." Moreover, the fact that those
district courts that have confrcnted
this issue disagree on the question
whether attorneys' fees are allowable
under section 101(25) and 107,,a)(4)(B)
demonstrates that the words "enforce-
ment activities" do not explicitly sig-
nal, with any persuasive degree of
clarity, that Congress intended to pro-
vide for an award of attorneys' fees to
private litigants.' °"
The court noted further that there was dis-
agreement on this issue among the district
courts of the Ninth Circuit.'"
On the other hand, in 1991, the Eighth
Circuit found in General Electric Co. v. Litton
Industries Automation Systems, Inc., th3t attorneys'
fees were recoverable by private parties in sec-
tion 107 actions."' The court held that attor-
neys' fees and litigation costs were a "neces-
sary cost of response.""' Moreover, the court
found that "response" was part of "enforcement
activities" as defined by section 101(25) of the
Act, for which recovery of attorneys' fees is pro-
vided by the statute."2 By that reasoning, the
court held that it is a matter of simple statuto-
ry interpretation to find that attorneys' fees are
recoverable in a section 107 action for cost
recovery."'
In 1994, the Supreme Court ii Keytronic v.
United States held that section 107 "does not pro-
vide for the award of private litigants' attor-
108. Id. (citing Santa Fe Pac. Realty Corp, v, United States,
780 F. Supp. 687. 695 (E.D Cal. 1991)) (emphasis added),
109. Seeid.at 1018.
110. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys..
Inc.. 920 F.2d 1415. 1421-22 (8th Cir 1990). cert. denied, I II S, Ct.
1390 (1991).
Il1. Id. at 1422.
112. Seeld.
113. Seeid.
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neys' fees associated with bringing a cost
recovery action." thus resolving the circuit split
on this issue."' The Court reasoned that
Congress had not explicitly included attorneys'
fees as -response costs," thus they could not
be recovered in a suit under that section."'
Not addressed by the Keytronic Court, how-
ever, was the issue of attorneys' fees in a sec-
tion 107 action when the federal government is
the plaintiff. In United States v. Chapman. the
Ninth Circuit reversed its position from Stanton
Road and held that, where the government is
the plaintiff, the statute contemplates attor-
neys' fees as a cost of response that is thus
recoverable, albeit subject to the test of "rea-
sonableness." 6 The Chapman court simply
noted that the Keytronic Court had declined to
address the issue of government as plaintiff,
and thus found that it was free to do so.
despite the fact that its holding was at odds
with the way the Keytronic Court ruled.""
In 1998, the Sixth Circuit further distin-
guished Keytronic, permitting recovery of attor-
neys' fees as response costs in a contribution
action under section 113.218 That court, in
Centerior Service v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal, rea-
soned that its holding was in fact supported by
the Keytronic Court's statement that section 113
explicitly authorized a remedy separate from
section 107, although it did not explicitly
address attorneys' fees as part of that remedy.
thus the attorneys' fees question could have a
different outcome in the section 113 context."'
Oddly, the Centerior court noted that the reme-
dies in section 107 and 113 were "overlapping,"
but nonetheless held that attorneys' fees were
recoverable under section 113, despite
Keytronic's holding that they were not under
section 107.'2 Thus, even in light of the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Keytronic,
the attorneys' fees issue continues to divide
114. 511 U.S. at 813-14 (emphasis added).
115. Seeid.
116. 146 F.3d 1166. 1173-74(9th Cir. 1998).
117. See id. at 1174 (citing Keytronic. 511 U.S. at 819).
118. See Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal
Corp. 153 E3d 344. 355-56 & n.14 (6th Cir. 1998).
119. Id.
120. Id.
the courts. Again, CERCLA litigation has
proven too complex and too diverse to be sub-
ject to uniform rules across the circuits or
across the statute.
It is interesting to note that recovery of
attorneys' fees is a sufficiently fundamental
issue so that the Supreme Court has estab-
lished the "American Rule" that attorneys' fees
generally are not recoverable by the prevailing
party.'2' The Court found that without specific
congressional authority under the American
Rule. a prevailing party could not recover attor-
neys' fees." The Court did, however, allow that
Congress could -carve out specific exceptions'
to the general rule against providing attorneys'
fees to the prevailing litigant." Apparently,
this specific exception may or may not exist for
CERCLA cases, depending on what type of lia-
bility is at issue, and under which section of
the statute the case is brought.
Clearly then, 'the issue of attorneys' fees
illustrates yet another area of significant geo-
graphic non-uniformity within CERCLA.
Perhaps more importantly, this example illus-
trates the non-uniformity of interpreting a very
fundamental provision of the CERCLA
statute.'21' In fact, this issue is fundamental
across the judicial system. If there is a place
where geographic uniformity in a federal
statute should exist, it would seem that such a
place would be the interpretation of the basic,
fundamental aspects of the statute. That is not
the case, however, with recovery of attorneys'
fees in CERCLA section 107 actions.
Notably, attorneys' fees and litigation costs
can be rather significant in CERCLA actions,
commonly running into the millions of dollars.
In Stanton Road, the litigation revolved around
relatively minor contamination from chemicals
used in a 'mom n' pop- dry cleaning shop."'
Nonetheless, the litigation costs incurred by
121. SeeAlyeska PpelineServ, Co, v, WildemessSoc'y.421
U.S. 240, 247 (1975), cited in KeMytImiv 511 U.S. at 819,
122. See L at 269
123, IgL
124. S&CERCLA§ 107.42 US d § 9607 (West 1998).
125. Stanton Road Assn v Lohrey Enterprises, 984 F.2d
1015. 1019 (9th Cir 1993)-
126 Seeid.
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the plaintiff totaled approximately $125,000.26
With regard to the vast majority of CERCLA lit-
igation, however, this is barely a "drop in the
bucket." Therefore, because of the money
involved, both in terms of attorneys' fees and
of the underlying liability, this is an area where
forum shopping is likely to be particularly ram-
pant, should the practice of applying the law of
the transferee court be followed. Moreover,
such an application could result in a double
loss for the plaintiff. First, following a transfer
granted upon the defendant's motion, the
plaintiff must litigate in the forum chosen by
the defendant, thus his choice of forum has not
been protected. Second, if the defendant suc-
cessfully transfers the case to a forum where
attorneys' fees are not recoverable, part of the
plaintiff's potential recovery has been perma-
nently destroyed, and the defendant has saved
himself from part of his potential financial
loss, simply through a procedural motion to
transfer venue.
5. Potentially Responsible Parties
Recovery Limitations
As a remediation action moves into the lia-
bility phase of the trial, parties who are poten-
tially responsible for funding the remediation
are identified. These potentially responsible
parties ("PRPs") eventually become the liti-
gants in a CERCLA action, either against one
another or the government for recovery of
cleanup costs incurred under section 107 or for
contribution from another defendant for
cleanup costs under section 1 13(f)(1).1'2
Federal courts are split on the issue of whether
an action brought by one PRP against another
must be characterized as one for contribution
under section 11 3(f)( 1). '28 The characterization
127. See CERCLA § 101(20)-(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)-(21)
(West 1998).
128. See City of Fresno v. NL Industries, Inc.. et al., 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15534 *1, *7 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
129. See CERCLA §§ 107. 113(f)(1). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613
(West 1998).
130. City of Fresno. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15534 at *14.
131. See supra Section IV.B.4.
132. See City of Fresno, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15534 at * 14.
133. See Id. at * 15 (citing In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d
of the action is important because under sec-
tion 107 liability is joint and several, whereas
the purpose of section 113 is to al'ocate liabil-
ity that has already been established. '29 "The
distinction carries significant consequences.
In a cost recovery action under section 107,
non-settling defendants face joint and several
liability. Under section 113(f)(l) such defen-
dants face only several liability. In addition,
the availability of defenses and the statute of
limitations potentially differ between the two
types of actions.""' Also, as shown above, the
recoverability of attorneys' fees may depend
on how the action is characterized.' '
In City of Fresno v. NL Industries, the court
held that the City, an admittedly responsible
party ("ARP") under section 107, was limited to
a contribution action against N L Industries
under section 113(f)(l).'" The primary reason
for the court's holding was a Ninth Circuit rul-
ing that "impliedly" held that regardless of how
an ARP characterized its action against a PRP,
the action was for contribution under section
113(f)(1), and could not be an action for cost
recovery under section 107.'" Essentially, the
court held that because the City had already
admitted liability, the City and any other
defendants would have to be joint tortfea-
sors."4 Under section 886A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, joint and several liability is
foreclosed once defendants have been so
established, and thus in the CERCLA context,
only a section II 3(f)(1) action for contribution
may be maintained.''
Evidence of non-uniformity in this context
can be found in the fact that another district
court in the Ninth Circuit has come to the
opposite result on similar facts."'  In
Transportation Leasing Co. v. State of California, the
246 (9th Cir. 1991)).
134. See id.
135. See id. at* 16-17 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 886 (where two parties are both "wrongdoers,. each is severally
liable only for its own equitable share of the liability)), See also
United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R. Co., 50 F3d 1530, 1536
(10th Cir. 1995) (any claim to reapportion cleanup costs between
PRPs is *the quintessential claim for contribution.' to permit a
liable party to recover under Section 107 would render Section
113 meaningless).
136. See Transportation Leasing Co. v, State of California,
861 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
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court sitting in the Central District of California
found that the weight of authority indicated that
an ARP could maintain an action for cost recov-
ery under section 107.3 The court reasoned that
"ltlhe question of whether plaintiffs can bring
suit under section 107(a) does not depend on
whether defendants may be held jointly and
severally liable. Similarly, the question of
whether joint or several liability applies does
not determine whether this action can be
brought under section 107 or must be brought
under section 113.""' The court held that to limit
a plaintiff to a section 11 3(f)(1) action would be
to frustrate the fundamental purpose of CER-
CLA to get contaminated sites cleaned up.
Therefore, establishing that a release or other
activity that would subject a party to section 107
liability had occurred was sufficient to defeat a
motion to limit the action to a section 113 suit
for contribution.'"
This split of authority over the issue of
whether an ARP's remedies are limited to a sec-
tion 113(f)(1) action for cbntribution again
points out the prevalence of geographic non-
uniformity within CERCLA with respect to very
fundamental aspects of the statute and of the
rights and duties of the parties thereunder. In
this context, neighboring district courts within
the same circuit came down on opposite sides
of this basic issue." In the Eastern District of
California, the party originally found liable
under section 107 may only seek contribution
from other PRPs, but may no longer seek the
protection of the elemental concept of joint and
several liability.'' In the adjacent Central District
of California, however, the originally liable party
137. Id.
138. Id. at 937.
139. See id. at 938. In addition to the clear split of authori-
ty pointed out in the comparison of these two cases, the court in
City of Fresno further stated that non-uniformity existed around
this issue by noting that -the First. Fifth. Seventh and Tenth
Circuits have limited an ARP to a contribution action: while the
other circuits have not so held. City of Fresno. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15534 at *15.
140. Compare City of Fresno v. NL Industries, Inc, et al..
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15534 at *7. uth Transportation Leasing Co.
v. State of Califomia. 861 F. Supp. at 937.
141. See City of Fresno. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15534 at "7.
142. See Transportation Leasing Co.. 861 F. Supp. at 937.
143. CERCLA § 105(a). 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (West 1998). See
may essentially overturn that initial finding of
liability if it is successful in a section 107 action
against other PRPs. '" When the stakes are this
high, and substantive liability appears immi-
nent, forum shopping and procedural maneu-
vering become extremely attractive. Applying
the law of the transferor court, however, defeats
forum shopping and instead permits the parties
and the court to focus on the substantive issues
at hand. As a consequence, this allows for the
upholding of the basic purposes of the statute,
including the proper allocation of liability.
6. Consistency with the NCP
The National Contingency Plan ("NCP") is a
body of regulations governing the clean up of
hazardous waste sites under CERCLA. 4' Under
section 107 of the Act, in order to prevail a plain-
tiff must demonstrate, interalia, that the "release
or threatened release lof a hazardous sub-
stancel has caused the plaintiff to incur
response costs consistent" with the NCP' "
Courts are split, however, on whether a plaintiff
must demonstrate consistency with the NCP to
obtain a partial summary judgment with respect
to the defendant's liability under section 107 or
whether liability can be established without a
showing of consistency with the NCR'4 For
example, the Second and Fifth Circuits have
held that consistency with the NCP is merely
indicative of damages, and therefore is not an
issue of fact that would restrict the court's abili-
ty to grant summary judgment on the issue of
liability.'' However, the Third and Ninth Circuits
have held that the plaintiff must demonstrate at
least some consistency with the NCP before
also 40 C.FR. Part 300 (1995)
144. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)1B), 42 US.C. § 9607(a)]4(B)
[West 1998). See also Redwing Camers v Saraland Apartments. 94
F3d 1489. 1496 (11th Cir 1993),
145. Compare United States v Alcan Aluminum. 990 F2d
711. 720 (2d Cir 1993) and Amoco Oil v Borden, Inc._ 889 E2d
664. 668 (5th Cir 1990). wth Washington State Dept. of Transp. v.
Washington Natural Gas. 59 F3d 793 (9th Cir 1995).
Weyerhaeuser Corp v. Koppers Co. 771 E Supp. 1406, 1413-14 (D.
Md. 1991) and Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle
County. 659 F Supp 1269. 1291-92 (D. Del, 1987). dfd 851 F2d
643 (3d Cir 1988)
146. See, eg.,Akan Aluminum. 990 F2d at 720-Amxo Ol 889
F.2d at 668,
147. See, eg.. Washington State Dept of Transp. v.
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The current rule in the Ninth Circuit
appears to be that consistency with the NCP
must be demonstrated by a CERCLA plaintiff
to facilitate an assessment of damages before
summary judgment can be granted on the
issue of liability.'" In Washington State Department
of Transportation v. Washington Natural Gas, "Itlhe
district court reserved the issue of damages for
a bench trial. On December 28, 1992, after the
bench trial, the district court issued a memo-
randum opinion finding that WSDOT failed to
substantially comply with the 1985 NCP.
Accordingly, the court concluded that WSDOT
was not entitled to damages."'49
Summary judgment is a drastic ruling,
despite its common usage. Granting a plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment denies a defen-
dant a chance to put his case before a jury, at
least on the issues covered by the motion.
Thus, geographic non-uniformity in the level of
proof required for summary judgment presents
a significantly different landscape for litigants
across different courts, despite the fact that the
statute under which they are litigating is a fed-
eral statute with national scope and purpose.
Where the transferee court follows the Ninth
Circuit approach, an application of the law of
the transferee court following a transfer would
create a significant incentive for a defendant to
seek a transfer, in order to quickly escape lia-
bility through summary judgment. in addition
to encouraging forum shopping, this creates
another situation where a procedural maneu-
ver (transfer of venue) can be almost com-
pletely dispositive. of the fundamental sub-
stantive issue of liability if the law of the trans-
feree court is applied following the transfer.
7. Medical Monitoring Costs
A final area that exemplifies the geograph-
Washington Natural Gas, 59 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1995);
Weyerhaeuser Corp v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406. 1413-14 (D.
Md. 1991); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle
County. 659 F Supp. 1269. 1291-92 (D. Del. 1987). affd 851 E2d
643 (3d Cir. 1988).
148. See Washington Natural Gas, 59 F.3d at 798.
149. Id. at 798-99.
150. See, e.g., Romeo v. General Chem., 922 F.2d 287 (N.D.
Cal. 1994).
151. Id.
ic non-uniformity of CERCLA case law is
whether courts will allow medical monitoring
costs as a component of a part)''s recovery.
Many health effects of toxic contamination are
not known at the time when liability for the
cleanup of the contamination is determined.
These effects must be monitored by doctors, in
some cases for many years, before their exis-
tence can be determined and/or measured.
Because of the uncertainty surroLnding their
existence and extent, courts have been hesi-
tant to allow these costs to be awarded to CER-
CLA plaintiffs as section 107 response costs."
In Romeo v. General Chemical, -the District
Court for the Northern District of California
granted the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss plaintiff's cost recovery action."' The
plaintiff sought cost recovery of thlee different
types, one of which was medical monitoring
costs."2 The court held that medical monitor-
ing costs do not constitute response costs
under CERCLA." The court cited a Tenth
Circuit decision in support of its holding and
stated that other district court cases in the
Ninth Circuit were "in accord." 4 The court also
cited similar holdings in cases fiom district
courts in other circuits around the country."'
The court noted, however, that some district
courts have found that medical monitoring
costs could be recoverable as response costs
where funds were expended for the purpose of
tracking the spread of a particular contami-
nant." Finally, the court noted that yet other
district courts have found that medical moni-
toring costs were recoverable, but had not
clearly explained why."' These hcldings may
represent more of a category of exceptions
than an example of non-uniformity, although
where no rationale has been set out It is diffi-
cult to say for sure. Thus, it appears that in this
152. See id. at 289.
153. See id. at 290.
154. See id. at 290-91 (citing Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F2d
1527. 1537 (10th Cir. 1992)).
155. See id. (citing Lutz v. Chromatex Inc., /18 F. Supp. 413,
417-18 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Coburn v. Sun Chem, Corp.. 28 ERC (BNA)
1665 (E.D. Pa, 1988)).
156. See id. at 291-92 (citing Werleln v, United States, 746 F.
Supp. 887, 902-03 (D. Minn. 1990)).
157. See id:
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area, non-uniformity in the interpretation of
CERCLA by various federal courts around the
country is not as much of a concern.
Alas that is not the case. In addition to the
above-cited aberrations in the federal case law,
the Romeo v. General Chemical holding exposes
yet another facet of geographic non-uniformity
differences between federal and state court rul-
ings on the same subject. In Potter v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., the California Supreme Court, in a
state law tort action, allowed plaintiff's award
of compensation for medical monitoring costs
arising out of exposure to defendant's toxic
waste."8 In fact, the Court went so far as to shift
the burden of proof on the required element of a
reasonable need for monitoring away from the
plaintiff because the need for monitoring, if it
existed, would have arisen out of the defendant's
tortious conduct.'" Thus, the California
Supreme Court permitted recovery of these
costs, whereas the overlapping federal court
most likely would not.
These holdings, one in federal court and
one in state court, leave a CERCLA litigant
seeking to recover medical monitoring costs in
a quandary. Bringing the suit in state court
under state law would seem to be the obvious
course for recovering these costs. Doing so,
however, may foreclose other federal claims
that the litigant may seek only in federal court.
But if the litigant brought the suit in a federal
district court sitting in California, the federal
court could invoke federal precedent.to deny
recovery of medical monitoring costs, despite
existing state supreme court precedent to the
contrary (assuming that CERCLA preempts the
state law claim).
Although this does not directly implicate
transfer of venue issues, it very well could.
Following defendant's removal of a state court
suit to federal court, the defendant's desire to
avoid other unfavorable provisions of that cir-
cuit's precedent, or perhaps the application- of
the law of the state in which that court sits,
could provide incentive for a motion to transfer
venue. Once again, applying the law of the
158. Potter v. Firestone ire & Rubber Co.. 6 Cal. 4th 965.
1006.07 (1993).
159. See id. at 1007.
transferee court in such a situation could
potentially result in a defendant defeating a
plaintiff's otherwise meritorious claims
through a series of procedural maneuvers.
8. Conclusion
These seven examples demonstrate the
geographic non-uniformity of CERCLA case
law, as well as the pervasiveness of this non-
uniformity throughout diverse and highly
important areas of the statute's reach. Some of
the implications of this characteristic of the
statute have been presented, while others are
perhaps obvious.
As demonstrated above in Part I11, most
federal courts have held that the law of the
transferee court should apply following a
transfer of venue in a federal question case.
However, there appears to be an exception
developing (and already developed in a few cir-
cuits) for cases where the application of the
federal statute has occurred in a geographical-
ly non-uniform manner. From the preceding
analysis. CERCLA appears to be sufficiently
non-uniform as to demand coverage under this
exception to the general rule.
V. Implications of Non-UnIformity of
CERCLA Case Law Among the Circuits
As with most legal concepts, the implica-
tions of this potentially interesting discovery
must be understood in the context of its appli-
cation. For example, does the application of
state law by the Eighth Circuit and the use of
federal common law by the Ninth Circuit have
a negative impact against the efficiency and
fairness of the judicial system?
There are a number of compelling reasons
why the transferor court's law should apply in
the transferee court following a section 1404
transfer of venue. First, there is a general pre-
sumption that the plaintiff in any case has cer-
tain rights that should be protected.' These
include having the matter in which the plaintiff
has invested time and expense litigated in a
160, See Van Dusex, 376 US. at 635; Fmirs, 494 US. at 522.
161. See van Dusex. 376 US. at 635. Ferens. 494 U.S. at 522.
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forum that is convenient and fair.'6' In part,
these concerns weigh against a transfer of
venue.162 However, where a transfer has been
granted, these concerns weigh heavily against a
further burden on a plaintiff by applying laws
that are essentially chosen by the defendant,
which is the case where the law of the transfer-
ee court is applied.6
3
Second, the substantive positions of the
parties should simply not be determined by
procedural maneuverings. '  This is particularly
important in the context of CERCLA where
precedent addressing some of the most funda-
mental substantive issues regulated by the
statute has developed in a non-uniform man-
ner. In sum, a plaintiff's choice of law should
always be protected where possible, unless
some federal policy concern outweighs this
consideration.
In the case of CERCLA, however, the plain-
tiff's choice of law frequently also supports the
federal policy underlying the statute-to facili-
tate and establish funding for the cleanup of as
many sites of toxic contamination in the coun-
try as possible. A plaintiff is unlikely to bring
suit, unless he desires that his property be
cleaned or that liability for the costs of such
cleanup are properly distributed among pollut-
ing parties. Moreover, the government relies on
the actions of private plaintiffs to assist in
enforcing and upholding the purposes of the
statute. Applying the law of the transferee court
may defeat the plaintiff's interests, the federal
government's interests, and the interests of the
general public, since toxic or hazardous sub-
stances are more likely to persist and are per-
haps less likely to be properly removed and
remediated following litigation under the
defendant's chosen body of law. Thus, applying
the law of the transferor court supports the
plaintiff's and the federal government's objec-
tives under the statute.
Finally, applying the law of the transferor
court also furthers the policy of maximizing
judicial economy and efficiency, which under-
162. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 635; Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 508 (1946) (setting out factors in the forum non conve-
niens context).
163. See generally cases cited supra note 162.
lies all of federal procedure.'6 ' Because of the
circuit split in determining which court's law to
apply, the resolution of this issue is costly,
time-consuming and requires substantial judi-
cial resources. In fact, the more advantageous
the application of district law is to one party (or
put another way, the greater geographic non-
uniformity in the existing law and the more
important the substantive issues about which
the statute is non-uniform), the more actively
litigated this question will be. Additionally,
CERCLA cases are often very complex, includ-
ing multiple causes of action by and against
multiple parties who are involved to varying
degrees and implicating both federal and state
statutes. Thus, the issue of what circuit's law to
apply in a CERCLA case may be particularly dif-
ficult to resolve. Without a clear anc simple rule
as to which court's law should apply following a
transfer of venue in a CERCLA case, none of the
important objectives of judicial eccnomy, max-
imization of public and private resources, or
predictability for litigants are served. In light of
the considerations discussed herein, It
becomes clear that, where a statute has result-
ed in the development of especially non-uni-
form law, the transferee court should be bound
by the transferor court's precedent following a
transfer of venue under section 1404(a).
The current transfer evaluation also con-
tains an inherent conflict that would be
resolved by adopting the rule of fc.llowing the
law of the transferor court. Currently, a court
may decide not to transfer a case to a more
convenient forum because the negative impli-
cations of applying the substantive law of the
transferee court are too great.'" Thus, the result
is increased inconvenience and expense in liti-
gation and reduced judicial efficiency and econ-
omy. Conversely, applying the law of the trans-
feror court permits the case to be litigated In
the forum that maximizes judicial economy and
efficiency while also protecting the substantive
rights of the parties.
In the absence of a Supreme Court pro-
164. See Santa Fe Pac. Realty Corp. v. United States, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4534 *4 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
165. Steinman, supra note 26.
166. See Ferens, 494 U.S. at 522-523.
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nouncement on the subject, it is unlikely that
circuit courts would strip themselves of the
discretion that comes with the "independent
judgment" rule. In light of Ferens, however, it
seems that the Supreme Court might make just
such a pronouncement 61 On the other hand,
the Court may feel that such an issue is more
properly the province of the legislature, since the
underlying substantive statute can be highly
determinative of when this rule should apply,
and the legislature was originally responsible for
enacting the statute. The Court may also be hes-
itant to make such a pronouncement because
although the issue of non-uniformity is so
closely tied to the specific statute, the Court's
ruling could be stretched over time to encom-
pass all federal question cases.
A legislative solution is rather simple.
Congress could amend section 113 of CERCLA
by adding subsection (c) which might state
"following a transfer of venue under section
1404(a), the law of the transferor court shall
apply to all matters of litigation issuing from
this statute." Such a simple promulgation
would be perhaps the easiest cleanup of a
mess ever to occur in the context of CERCLA. If
possible, this amendment should be made
sooner rather than later. As the workloads of
the federal courts (including the Supreme
Court) continue to increase, there will be less
and less opportunity to resolve conflicts
167. Id. at 522 ('Section 1404(a) should not create or mul-
tiply opportunities for forum shopping .... The decision to trans-
fer venue under section 1404(a) should turn on considerations of
- convenience and the interest of justice rather than on the possi-
ble prejudice resulting from a change of law.).
168. Congress could also amend section 113(b) to restrict
venue to the place where the release occurred. See SWDA §
7002(a), 42 U.S.C. 6972(a) (West 1998). The drawback of this
approach, however, is that it takes discretion away from the plain-
among the circuits. Thus, delaying this clarifi-
cation will result in a worsening of the situa-
tion of geographic non-uniformity, possibly to
the point where any substantive benefit of
CERCLA litigation is buried in a mound of pro-
cedure.'"
VI. Conclusion
As has been demonstrated, there are many
fundamental areas where CERCLA case law
has developed in a geographically non-uniform
fashion. CERCLA is so geographically non-uni-
form that it is necessary, as a rule, to apply the
law of the transferor court following a transfer
of venue under section 1404(a). This rule could
be put in place either by the Supreme Court or
by Congress. This is not to say that where case
law resulting from federal statutes has devel-
oped in a uniform manner that the independ-
ent judgment of the transferee court should
also be abridged, although that would be pos-
itive in many other ways as well. Non-unifor-
mity, however, presents unique circumstances
and enhanced reasons why the transferor
court's law should apply. Particularly in cases
arising out of non-uniform statutes, applica-
tion of the transferor court's law protects the
rights and interests of plaintiffs, the govem-
ment, the courts and the general public.
tiff. and may result in a reduction of convenience. contrary to. for
example, Van Dusen, On the other hand. it would keep the liabili-
ty and litigation with the pollution, thus assuring that "local-
courts are able to deal wth Iocal- problems, which they may
know besL Moreover. this would be consistent with the principle
that entities that avail themselves of the benefits and protections
of a iurisdiction's laws should also be subject to the jurisdiction
of Its courts. These advantages, however. may promote rather
than reduce non.uniformity. thus this solution is not preferable.
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